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REEXAMINING THE VICARIOUS CRIMINAL
LIABILITY OF CORPORATIONS FOR THE
WILLFUL CRIMES OF THEIR EMPLOYEES
EVAN TUTTLE*
ABSTRACT
Corporate compliance programs in the United States have evolved substantially in
the past several decades, expanding exponentially in both number and scope. Yet, our
legal standard of corporate criminal liability for the acts of employees has remained
largely unchanged for the past fifty years. United States v. Hilton Hotels established
that a corporation can be held liable for the acts of its employee, even though the
employee’s conduct may be contrary to their actual instructions or contrary to the
employer’s stated policies. That holding, cited with favor by the Supreme Court, was
based on a deeply flawed interpretation of precedent, yet has stood as good law for
nearly five decades.
Corporations are innately unsympathetic “victims” to this injustice, but the
potential harm spreads far beyond the Fortune 500. Prosecutorial discretion is the sole
bulwark protecting corporations of all sizes from the potential of liability under Hilton
Hotels. There is not a clear method of eschewing vicarious liability in criminal cases.
Under the current regime, a corporation could pour a nearly endless amount of money
towards a compliance function that has no guarantee of protecting the company from
the criminal inclinations of a single rogue employee. This Note suggests that an
affirmative defense to the common law doctrine of respondeat superior would be in
the best interests of justice.

* J.D., May 2022, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. I’d like to thank my Dad and Bennett
Kuhar for going the extra mile to edit this Note, and the Cleveland State Law Review editors
and associates for working so hard. I would also like to thank Sydney Victor, who was a
tremendous mentor to me while I was writing this Note.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a corporation is liable for the actions of
its employee, so long as those actions were within the scope of the employee’s duties
and were intended, at least in part, to benefit the corporation. 1 The doctrine has been
in use since the mid-nineteenth century, but continually grew alongside the shifting
corporate environment of the twentieth century.2 As corporations became bigger, a
comprehensive regulatory system to prevent fraud and anticompetitive practices
became increasingly important.3 When employees would violate these regulations as
individuals, the doctrine of respondeat superior was invoked to hold their employers
liable as well.4 Holding corporations liable for the acts of their agents is a practice
supported by compelling public policy logic.5 Corporations are often in a better
position to monitor and control employees than the government. Further, allowing
corporations to disavow the unlawful acts of employees would open the door to unjust

1 See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909); U.S. Dep’t
of Just., Just. Manual §9-28.210(b) (2018).
2 1 KATHLEEN F. BRICKEY, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY § 1:03 (Clark Boardman
Callaghan 2d ed. 1992).
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Charles J. Walsh & Alissa Pyrich, Corporate Compliance Programs as a Defense to
Criminal Liability: Can a Corporation Save Its Soul?, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 605, 617 (1995).
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scapegoating and permit corporations to benefit from unlawful acts without fear of
reprisal.
But employers should be allowed to shed liabilities that are created by truly rogue
actors. When an employee acts in a manner that any reasonable person would consider
to be against the objective intent of corporation, the corporation should not be
punished.6 This Note looks at a specific example of such extraordinary behavior:
violating direct orders from a superior to further a personal grudge. Holding
corporations responsible for the actions of employees, who defy explicit orders from
superiors for personal reasons, is unreasonable and impractical, and creates a
compliance environment that is contrary to public policy.
This Note proposes that the best solution to this inequity is an affirmative defense
to the doctrine of respondeat superior. If an employer can prove that the employee had
a personal grudge or intended malice when the unlawful action was taken, the
employer will have shown that the employee was acting outside of the scope of his
employment, regardless of whether the unlawful action benefitted the employer in
some way. The employer could still be required to return ill-gotten gains, as a lack of
liability would not somehow clean the tainted proceeds. But the employer could avoid
the punitive aspects of criminal liability in a manner that is just and supported by
public policy.
Part II of this Note examines the history of the doctrine of respondeat superior, and
how it has shaped the current law of corporate criminal liability. Next will be an
examination of compliance programs and their role in determining liability. This will
transition into discussion of Hilton Hotels,7 the preeminent case regarding a
corporation’s liability for its employee’s actions. Part III contrasts Hilton Hotels to
Klor’s v. Broadway-Hale Stores, a case decided by the Supreme Court that the Circuit
Court in Hilton Hotels incorrectly relied on to justify its ruling.8 Part IV of this Note
examines the impracticality of a corporation creating a compliance program for its
employee’s personal whims and the inconsistency of this rule with various other
related areas of law. Part V identifies and analyzes a range of solutions to the problem,
including the aforementioned common law defense, a statutory provision, an
expansion of the Justice Department’s guidelines for prosecution, or a reform of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
II. THE HISTORY OF CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY: RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR TO
MODERN VICARIOUS LIABILITY
Although the doctrine of respondeat superior existed in English common law as
far back as 1698,9 the first major usage in the United States was not until 1838.10 At

6 See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co., 212 U.S. at 495–96.
7 United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1125 (1973).
8 Klor’s v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
9 Jones v. Hart [1698] 91 Eng. Rep. 382 (K.B.).
10 Wright v. Wilcox, 19 Wend. 343 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838).
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that time, respondeat superior was only applied to find vicarious liability in tort law.11
Principals could avoid liability if they could prove that their agent had acted
“willfully” to commit the tortious action.12 This defense came under criticism for a
variety of reasons13 and courts grew more inclined to find liability with principals
whose agents had committed willful acts.14 Courts began to apply a “scope of
employment” analysis to determine what authority the principal had granted to its
agent.15 The test for determining whether an agent’s action was within their “scope of
employment” was based around the factors of timing, location, and purpose. 16 These
factors have each spawned a number of legal sub-doctrines in their own right,17 but
most pressing to this Note is the notion of purpose: whether or not the agent was acting
in performance of the role for which they were hired. 18 In 1893, the Supreme Court
ruling in Lakeshore & Southern Michigan Railway Co. v. Prentice laid the foundation
of our modern understanding of transferred intent in respondeat superior cases.19 The
Court in Prentice held that, whatever wicked intent mens rea element is at issue in a
case, “if proved in the agent, may be imputed to the corporation”20 in order to prove
the corporation’s culpability in a crime.
The doctrine continued to develop in response to the growth of corporations. 21
Corporations became the predominant business entity over the course of the nineteenth
century, and courts began to find corporations criminally liable to curb their darker

11 See Andrew Weissmann & David Newman, Rethinking Corporate Criminal Liability, 82
IND. L.J. 411, 419 (2007).
12 Id.
13 Besides the obvious interests to plaintiffs in having the ability to sue principals, there was
also discussion that precedent had been poorly interpreted. See Justice Holmes’ critique in
Dempsey v. Chambers, 28 N.E. 279 (Mass. 1891).
14 See, e.g., Ploof v. Putnam, 75 A. 277 (Vt. 1910).
15 Ralph L. Brill, The Liability of an Employer for the Wilful Torts of His Servants, 45 CHI.KENT L. REV. 1, 5 (1968).
16 The Second Restatement of Agency uses the terminology time, place, and purpose.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 229 (AM. L. INST. 1958).
17 These revolve around the definitions of each term within the respondeat superior doctrine.
For instance, “master and servant” law, which has now blended with other areas to become the
more holistic “agency” law, examines the relationship between the employer and employee. It
is remarkable how deeply rooted some of these agency and vicarious liability concepts are in
the common law, and that they are still seen as good law today. See, e.g., Fred Moore Whitney,
Respondeat Superior, in CORNELL HIST. THESES AND DISSERTATIONS COLLECT. (1891).
18 Brill, supra note 15, at 6.
19 Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101, 114 (1893).
20 Id. at 110.
21 1 BRICKEY, supra note 2, § 2:02.
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impulses.22 Congress responded to this corporate growth by prohibiting
anticompetitive conduct23 and creating labor standards.24 A corporation held property
separate from the property of its owners, and liability could only be imposed on a
corporation for the actions of its agents, directors and officers. As such, the doctrine
of respondeat superior was always going to be required for a finding of corporate
criminal liability.25
As the century turned, courts continued to expand the notion of what a corporation
might be criminally liable for.26 All of these decisions culminated in the 1909
Supreme Court case New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Co. v. United

22 Id. § 1:03.
23 The Sherman Antitrust Act was created during the American Industrial Revolution as
Congress became increasingly aware of the rapid consolidation of business resources across the
country. Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7).
24 The Clayton Act followed and added new behaviors that were considered anticompetitive.
Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27 & 29 U.S.C. §§ 52–
53).
25 Corporations can now also be held criminally liable under strict liability statutes. These
so-called “regulatory offenses” are distinct from the corporate criminal liability discussed in the
rest of this Note. Regulatory offenses are most often misdemeanors punished by fine, in
conformance with conventional understanding of the Eighth Amendment. Early in United States
history, “corporations were predominantly established to serve public or quasi-public ends.”
See Weissmann & Newman, supra note 11, at 419–20. Regulation was more of front-end matter,
with corporate charters being hard to come by. But the public purpose component mitigated the
need for a large regulatory system.
26 This expansion was virtually a direct response to increasingly creative forms of corporate
skullduggery. Some examples of this will be explored in more detail later in this Note, but it is
important to understand that there was a more flagrant tone and scale to corporate malfeasance
at the turn of the century than would ever be possible today. Consider the infamous activities of
J.D. Rockefeller’s Standard Oil Company that were revealed by Ida Tarbell in her 1904 exposé.
See IDA M. TARBELL, THE HISTORY OF THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY (1904). Standard Oil had
the lion’s share of the U.S. oil refining industry as far back as the 1870s, but it somehow was
never enough. Tarbell uncovered some truly predatory practices that Rockefeller used against
competitors, as well as retailers who refused to sell his products. As far as illegal activity goes,
Tarbell was able to prove that Standard Oil was illegally collaborating with railroad companies
to help force competitors out of business. Eventually, in what was perhaps the crowning
achievement of the Sherman Act, Standard Oil was found to be an illegal trust and split into 34
smaller companies. That was certainly a win for the antitrust crowd but was by no means the
extent of Standard Oil’s crimes. For reasons that are not particularly clear, Standard Oil was not
pressed on some of the crimes which were revealed during its antitrust trial including, but not
limited to, corporate espionage and outright bribing of public officials. See id.; see also BRIA
16 2 b Rockefeller and the Standard Oil Monopoly, CONST’L RIGHTS FOUND. https://www.crfusa.org/bill-of-rights-in-action/bria-16-2-b-rockefeller-and-the-standard-oil-monopoly.html
(last visited Sept.10, 2021). Regardless, our modern understanding of vicarious corporate
liability was required to for the illegal trust finding in United States v. Standard Oil, as the price
fixing and illegal railroad activity was largely done by corporate agents.
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States.27 In perhaps the most foundational decision in modern agency law, the
Supreme Court found no problem imposing liability on a corporation for the acts of
its agents.28 The Court laid out a clear test for when corporations may properly be held
liable for the criminal acts of their agents:
In such cases the liability is not imputed because the principal actually
participates in the malice or fraud, but because the act is done for the benefit
of the principal, while the agent is acting within the scope of his employment
in the business of the principal, and justice requires that the latter shall be
held responsible for damages to the individual who has suffered by such
conduct.29
This test pulls the two distinct elements from vicarious civil liability and ingrains
them as requirements for a finding of vicarious criminal liability. First, the agent must
be acting within the scope of their employment. Second, the agent must be acting for
the benefit of the principal.
The Court in New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Co. summarized its
reasoning by stating:
Applying the principle governing civil liability, we go only a step farther in
holding that the act of the agent, while exercising the authority delegated to
him . . ., may be controlled, in the interest of public policy, by imputing his
act to his employer and imposing penalties upon the corporation for which
he is acting in the premises.30
This public policy can generally be described as preventing corporate malfeasance,
though there are numerous (if not infinite) ways in which corporations might abuse
the public.31 Punishing corporations for the acts of their agents is meant to encourage
corporations to take affirmative steps towards preventing their agents’ misdeeds.
A.

Corporate Compliance

Corporate compliance programs have public policy benefits beyond crime
prevention. Compliance programs, and a corresponding system of reporting, make it
much easier for investigators to uncover criminal activity.32 Compliance programs

27 N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R. R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909). Agent of
defendant railroad corporation provided illegal rebates in order to attract specific customers
away from water transportation options. Agent and defendant corporation were convicted under
the Elkins Act, 32 Stat. 847. The Circuit Court of the S.D.N.Y. affirmed and the Supreme Court
granted certiorari, seemingly to clarify this issue of corporate criminal liability.
28 Id. at 494–95.
29 Id. at 493.
30 Id. at 494.
31 See id.
32 Philip A. Wellner, Effective Compliance Programs and Corporate Criminal Prosecutions,
27 CARDOZO L. REV. 497, 511 (2005).
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make the prosecution of corporate crime easier and more affordable. 33 Compliance
creates clear benefits for the Government, but what legal benefit is conferred to
corporations in exchange for implementing these programs?
Compliance programs create two distinct legal benefits for corporations, but
neither benefit, taken separately or together, provides a path to shed liability entirely.
First, compliance programs can serve as evidence of conforming to a duty of care in
litigation,34 but whether a defendant’s conduct conformed to the standard of care is a
matter for a jury.35 Whether or not a corporation has a right to a trial by a jury of its
peers, and who those peers might be, is a complex matter that could fill this entire
Note.36 For the purposes of this Note, it is sufficient to point out that juries are no
friends to corporations.37 Further, juries are generally posed with the simple question
of whether the corporation breached its duty to supervise its employees. 38 While
certainly more palatable to the average juror, this terminology runs close to the res
ipsa loquitor theory of negligence. This would not pose any issue if the same defenses
available to the average tort defendant were available to corporate respondeat superior
defendants.39 In any case, if these issues of juries and duties seem to be unfair to
corporate defendants, they are consistent with the public policy considerations
explored above. Attempting to alter them without violating public policy would be a
difficult task, a notion which will be explored more in the analysis portion of this Note.
The second legal benefit that compliance programs confer on corporations relates
to sentencing. Corporations that install comprehensive compliance programs can also
receive favorable sentencing considerations in respondeat superior cases.40 Federal
judges are required to consider the guidelines provided by the United States
33 Id. at 504.
34 See, e.g., Richard S. Gruner, Risk and Response: Organizational Due Care to Prevent
Misconduct, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 613, 636 (2004); Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 5, at 677.
(“Allowing a corporation to escape liability if it can demonstrate an adequate, effectively
operating compliance program is consistent with the traditional notions of allocating criminal
responsibility.”).
35 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 328C (AM. L. INST. 1965).
36 Peter J. Henning, The Conundrum of Corporate Criminal Liability: Seeking a Consistent
Approach to the Constitutional Rights of Corporations in Criminal Prosecutions, 63 TENN. L.
REV. 793, 862–64 (1996).
37 Robert J. MacCoun, Differential Treatment of Corporate Defendants by Juries: An
Examination of the "Deep-Pockets" Hypothesis, 30 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 121, 140–41 (1996).
This study separates the notion of jury bias towards defendants with money from jury bias
towards corporate or commercial activity, and finds that jurors have a bias against corporations,
regardless of money.
38 1 BRICKEY, supra note 2, at § 3.
39 Res Ipsa Loquitor, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). Tort defendants have the
opportunity to proffer some evidence that demonstrates that a non-negligent scenario could have
still resulted in the plaintiff’s injury. If successful, this takes the case out of the realm of res ipsa
loquitor and forces the plaintiff to prove all of the elements of negligence individually.
40 Wellner, supra note 32, at 507.
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Sentencing Commission before ruling on a sentence.41 The guidelines for sentencing
corporations are numerous, complex, and filled with ambiguity. 42 For a compliance
program to be factored into sentencing, it must comply with the requirements of §
8B2.1.43 First, it is important to note that compliance programs must satisfy all of the
requirements in order to be of any value under these guidelines. There is no mention
of a good faith effort creating any benefit. This is all or nothing and is eerily similar
to strict liability. Next, the exercise of “due diligence” is at the forefront of the
requirements. That mirrors the duty of care mentioned above. It seems something of a
foregone conclusion that if a jury finds a defendant corporation breached its duty, the
defendant could not have simultaneously exercised due diligence.44 As such, the
benefit that compliance programs confer during sentencing could be negated unless
the judge disagrees with the jury on this issue.
Even though these legal benefits may be somewhat lacking, corporate decision
makers have additional incentives to form compliance functions. There are ethical and
moral obligations to encourage a lawful society, and significant public relations
benefits that come from being seen as a well-meaning corporation. Given the totality
of these benefits, it can be concluded that any corporate decision maker would want
there to be at least some form of compliance program put in place within their
company. There are of course instances of insufficient compliance activity or even
outright compliance disregard.45 However, the size of the global compliance industry
supports what common sense suggests—most companies truly are trying to encourage
their employees towards proper conduct.46 While much of the compliance industry’s

41 See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
42 Id. § 8C2.5. Problems within Chapter Eight could serve as a note topic in its own right.
The guidelines purport to provide a formulaic approach to sentencing but are riddled with illdefined terms and arbitrary thresholds. For example, the number of “employees” a corporation
has is a significant factor in determining culpability in the Guidelines’ Culpability Score portion.
Organizations are found to be more culpable the larger they are. As explained in § 8C2.5’s
Background portion: “Because of the continuum of sizes of organizations and
professionalization of management, subsection (b) gradually increases the culpability score
based upon the size of the organization and the level and extent of the substantial authority
personnel involvement.” The levels are set at 10, 50, 200, 1000 and 5000 or more employees,
with each level corresponding to an additional “point” of culpability. Consider then that an
increase of even a single culpability point could raise the sentenced fine by 20-40%.
43 Id. § 8B2.1.
44 One justification for this procedure lies in the Introductory Commentary section of Chapter
8. “First, the court must, whenever practicable, order the organization to remedy any harm
caused by the offense. The resources expended to remedy the harm should not be viewed as
punishment, but rather as a means of making victims whole for the harm caused.” Id. § 8. The
authors intended to shift losses away from victims and onto defendant corporations.
45 See infra notes 102–111 (discussion on Enron and other bad actors).
46 The enterprise governance, risk and compliance (“eGRC”) market, has grown at an
astounding pace. The global market has shot up from 22 billion USD in 2017 to 32.6 billion in
2020. See eGRC Market by Component (Software and Services), Software (Usage and Type),
Type (Policy Management, Compliance Management, Audit Management, Incident
Management, and Risk Management), Business Function, Vertical, and Region - Global
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growth can be attributed to corporations restructuring away from the conventional “in
house” model of compliance towards a more technologically advanced one, the
tremendous projections of future industry growth outpace this shift.47 Whether it be
for good or simply to protect their bottom line, corporations are continually increasing
their compliance efforts.
But even as corporations take compliance more seriously with each passing year,
there are old relics of a less regulated era that still float adrift in the law. Some would
argue that the entire notion of corporate criminal liability is one such outdated
remnant.48 That is a more philosophical issue than this Note deigns to address.
Corporate leaders are aware that their companies can be held criminally liable for the
actions of their employees, and that notice alone can be seen as enough to mitigate the
unfairness of the very concept of corporate criminal liability. Rather, what is
concerning is the gray area that exists between legitimate, good faith compliance
efforts and the vicarious liability that those efforts should eliminate.
III. THE CONFOUNDING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HILTON HOTELS AND KLOR’S
Vicarious liability has been attached to employers even when they take steps to
discourage the illegal activities of employees. Hilton Hotels is the seminal case in this
area of the law.49 That decision vaguely defined a broader view of an employer’s
liability for an employee’s action that has left a void of uncertainty around corporate
compliance.50 Beyond being simply nebulous, the decision in Hilton Hotels was
incorrect, based on a misinterpretation of a Supreme Court ruling and a dubious
understanding of the history of vicarious liability.
In United States v. Hilton Hotels, defendant corporation Hilton Hotels appealed its
Sherman Act conviction to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 51 At the time of the
indictment, the Portland branch of Hilton Hotels was involved in an organization of
hotels, restaurants, and their suppliers.52 The organization’s purpose was to attract

Forecast
to
202,
MARKETS
AND
MARKETS
(June
2020),
https://www.marketsandmarkets.com/Market-Reports/enterprise-governance-risk-compliancemarket-1310.html.
47 Some suggest a compound annual growth rate of 13.3%. Id.; see also Fortune Bus. Insights,
Enterprise Governance, Risk, and Compliance Market to Hit $64.55 Bn by 2027; Rising
Demand for Effective Risk Management Tools from Businesses to Fuel Growth,
GLOBENEWSWIRE (Oct. 16, 2020, 07:12 ET), https://www.globenewswire.com/newsrelease/2020/10/16/2109787/0/en/Enterprise-Governance-Risk-and-Compliance-Market-toHit-64-55-Bn-by-2027-Rising-Demand-for-Effective-Risk-Management-Tools-fromBusinesses-to-Fuel-Growth-Fortune-Business-Insights.html (projecting a CAGR of 13.3%).
48 See Bruce Coleman, Comment, Is Corporate Criminal Liability Really Necessary?, 29
SMU L. REV. 908 (1975).
49 United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1972).
50 Id. at 1007.
51 Id. at 1002.
52 Id.
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conventions to Portland for the benefit of its members.53 The organization asked
members to make voluntary contributions to fund it.54 However, the members of the
organization who represented hotels sought to force the members who represented
suppliers to contribute to the endeavor.55 These hotel members agreed amongst
themselves to give preferential purchasing treatment to the supplier members who
contributed funds to the organization, in a form of boycott.56 At trial, involvement
with the boycott was deemed to be a per se violation of the Sherman Act. 57
The Hilton employee who engaged in the boycott, the purchasing agent in charge
of buying supplies, was explicitly instructed by his supervisor to not participate in the
boycott on two occasions.58 It was further revealed at trial that the purchasing agent
had engaged in the boycott due to a “personal pique” he had against an agent of one
of the boycotted suppliers.59 The trial court ignored the role of personal grudges in the
matter and held that Hilton was liable for the Sherman Act violation, holding: “A
corporation is responsible for acts of its agents . . . even though their conduct may be
contrary to their actual instructions or contrary to the corporation's stated policies.”60
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s ruling, stating that “as a
general rule, a corporation is liable under the Sherman Act for the acts of its agents in
the scope of their employment, even though contrary to general corporate policy and
express instructions to the agent.”61 The defendant raised the matter of the purchasing
agent’s personal grudge in their appeal.62 The Ninth Circuit swept this argument aside
as having been decided by the Supreme Court in Klor’s v. Broadway-Hale Stores.63

53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id. Defendant argued on appeal that there was no per se violation of the Sherman Act
because the boycott’s purpose “was solely to bring convention dollars into Portland”, and not
to destroy competitors. The Court did not find this compelling, finding that the intent to restrain
competition was what constituted the violation, and that defendant’s ultimate objective was
“immaterial.”
58 Id. at 1004.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 1007.
62 Id. at 1008.
63 Id. at 12 n.1.
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In Klor’s, the plaintiff sought treble damages under the Clayton Act64 for the
defendant’s alleged violations of the Sherman Act. 65 The plaintiff was a small store
competing with its more sizeable neighbor, the defendant.66 The defendant conspired
with its network of manufacturers and distributors to harm plaintiff.67 This network
would either refuse to sell big-name appliances to the plaintiff or do so at
discriminatory prices.68 This ensured that the plaintiff could not effectively compete
in the market.69
The defendant had moved for dismissal for failure to state a cause of action.70 The
defense argued, and the District Court agreed, that the controversy was a “purely a
private quarrel” between plaintiff and defendant, with no effect on the public. 71 The
District Court granted the motion to dismiss,72 which was subsequently affirmed by
the Ninth Circuit on appeal, before being granted certiorari.73 The issue posed to the
Supreme Court was whether the Sherman Act was violated when a group of more
powerful businessmen act in concert to deprive a single merchant of the goods it needs
to compete.74 The Court was not moved by the defendant’s claim that this was a
“purely private quarrel,”75 finding that a monopoly is forbidden, even if it only hurts
one merchant at a time. The Court explained, “Monopoly can as surely thrive by the
elimination of such small businessmen, one at a time, as it can by driving them out in
large groups.”76 The Court accordingly reversed the decision and remanded the case
for trial.77

64 15 U.S.C. § 15(a). Under the Clayton Act, a plaintiff is entitled to recover three times the
amount suffered by the prohibited conduct, in addition to reasonable attorney’s fees.
65 Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 208 (1959).
66 Id. at 208, 213.
67 Id. at 208–09.
68 Id. at 209.
69 Id. Defendant did not dispute the allegations, acknowledging that its actions had harmed
the plaintiff.
70 Id.
71 Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 255 F.2d 214, 221 (9th Cir. 1958).
72 Id.
73 Id. at 235.
74 Klor’s, 359 U.S. at 210.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 213.
77 Id. at 214. The concurrence, written and supported solely by Justice Harlan, seemed to
make no opinion on the case as a matter of law. Rather, Justice Harlan thought that regardless
of the majority’s opinion, there were sufficient allegations in the complaint that entitled the
plaintiff to reach trial.
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When the Ninth Circuit relied on Klor’s to decide Hilton Hotels, it erroneously
created an equivalency between an employee’s personal grudge and a corporation
eliminating its competitors one at a time. The decision pulled a Supreme Court holding
about the Sherman Act and applied it to a respondeat superior case, which only
incidentally involved the Sherman Act. By doing so, the Ninth Circuit incorrectly
decided the Hilton Hotels case, and created a fallacious precedent that has still not
been overturned.78
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM CREATED BY HILTON HOTELS
The decision in Hilton Hotels established that an employee’s personal objectives,
malicious as they might be, have no bearing on the employee’s scope of employment.
The Ninth Circuit was quick to harken back to the old truism that respondeat superior
can still be satisfied so long as the employer benefits in some way from the employee’s
conduct. The Ninth Circuit failed to understand that the defense’s argument in Hilton
Hotels did not target the benefit to the employer element but in fact targeted the scope
of employment element. The defense in Hilton Hotels must have known that they
would never prevail on an “employer benefit” argument because the case law had
become well established by that point.79 It is difficult to know whether the defense
failed to make that obvious or if the Ninth Circuit is to blame. Regardless, the real
question of Hilton Hotels should have been this: Can an employee who commits an
unlawful act for personal, nonbusiness reasons, against the direct and explicit
instructions of his supervisor, be considered to be acting within the scope of their
employment? The answer to that question should be an emphatic “no.”
The doctrine of respondeat superior as a whole is grounded in the principles of
negligence; that a corporation must monitor its employees with a reasonable degree of
care. However, the second element, benefit to the employer, is only included by some

78 The Supreme Court subsequently denied certiorari. W. Int'l Hotels Co. v. United States,
409 U.S. 1125 (1973). It is unclear whether this was because the highest Court concurred with
the case’s outcome, or if there was some other consideration in play. However, the Court
explicitly addressed the Hilton Hotels ruling in 1982. Am. Soc'y of Mech. Eng'rs v. Hydrolevel
Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 582 n.6 (1982). The Court honed in on Hilton Hotels’ commonly used
“even when done against company orders” language, but made no mention of the concerns
raised in this Note. In fact, the Court went on to highlight the Ninth Circuit’s observation that
antitrust violations “are usually motivated by a desire to enhance profits, involve basic policy
decisions, and must be implemented over an extended period of time.” Id. It is startling to see
the Court generalize the nature of a crime instead of recognizing the facts specific to Hilton
Hotels. While those observations are certainly true of most antitrust offenses, the U.S. does not
convict based on what happens in most cases. This also adds to the notion that offenses like
those described under the Sherman Act have been applied as strict liability, even when Congress
has made no assertion of strict liability.
79 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 128 (5th Cir. 1962). The Hilton Hotels
court cites to Standard Oil v. United States in evaluating the “employer benefit” element, stating
that a “purpose to benefit the corporation is necessary to bring the agent’s acts within the scope
of his employment”. United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1008 n.4 (9th Cir.
1972). While this interpretation looks at the “employer benefit” element as a prerequisite step
to scope of employment, the difference between this view and a “two element test” view is
negligible for the purposes of this Note.
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courts,80 and only in cases where the agent’s conduct is actually or potentially
detrimental to the corporation.81 In fact, the employer benefit element has all but
vanished from judicial explanation of the doctrine, with modern courts favoring a
broad social policy approach colloquially referred to as the “deep-pocket” theory.82
Developed throughout the early 20th century, the “deep-pocket” or “entrepreneur”
theory finds that employers are in a better position to pay victims than employees, and
that employers can spread out their potential liability cost through insurance. 83 The
employer is thus the person best suited to bear the cost of the harm.84 This notion has
spread from tort-based vicarious liability to vicarious liability for criminal acts. 85 As
a result, both the Restatement (Third) of Agency86 and the Model Penal Code87 do
away with the employer benefit element entirely, and attach liability to the employer
based solely on whether the employee was acting within the scope of their
employment.
The legislative intent of the Sherman Act does seem to support this, 88 but the
courts have readily applied it as such in all sorts of regulatory matters. The multitude
of cases in this area largely center on a few archetypal employee motivations that the
corporation is, quite reasonably, expected to anticipate. These include a desire to earn
approval or promotion within the company, a desire to make money or reach a bonus
threshold, a desire to see competitors fail,89 and most of the other desires one might

80 See, e.g., United States v. Automated Med. Lab’ys, Inc., 770 F.2d 399, 406–07 (4th Cir.
1985).
81 MIRIAM F. WEISMANN, CORPORATE CRIME & FINANCIAL FRAUD: LEGAL AND FINANCIAL
IMPLICATIONS OF CORPORATE MISCONDUCT 13 (2012).
82 Brill, supra note 15, at 2.
83 Id. at 2–3.
84 Id.
85 See supra notes 10–13.
86 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (AM. L. INST. 2006).
87 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07 (AM. L. INST. 2009).
88 United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1006 (9th Cir. 1972).
89 See, e.g., United States v. Automated Med. Lab’ys, Inc., 770 F.2d 399 (4th Cir. 1985).
Defendant Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc. (“AML”), its wholly owned subsidiary
Richmond Plasma Corporation, and three employees were charged for engaging in a conspiracy
to conceal records from the Food and Drug Administration. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the
defendant corporation AML’s conviction even though its subsidiary’s employee was acting
according to his “ambitious nature and his desire to ascend the corporate ladder.” The court
reasoned that “Partucci was clearly acting in part to benefit AML since his advancement within
the corporation depended on AML’s well-being and its lack of difficulties with the FDA.” Id.
at 407.
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expect of a corporate employee.90 All of these could be considered “business reasons,”
which is the term this Note is using to encompass this group of activities. A
“nonbusiness reason” could thus be defined as a motivation which does not aim to
provide benefit to the employer and does not flow from an employee’s desire to
succeed in business.91
The first element of the doctrine (scope of employment) has remained dreadfully
ambiguous since its inception. It can contain not only what is in an employee’s job
description, but also what an employee has been authorized, either actually or
apparently, to do during their course of employment.92 And, according to the holding
in Hilton Hotels, it can even contain activities that are against the express instructions
of superiors.93
That portion of the Hilton Hotels ruling is particularly tortured when compared to
agency law. Under the law of agency, a principal may be liable for the acts that an
agent had the actual or apparent authority to do.94 The principal’s explicit instruction
not to commit an act would serve to fully revoke any actual authority. 95 So under
agency law, one would say that the purchasing agent in Hilton Hotels had no actual
authority. Apparent authority depends on a third party’s perception of the agent’s
authority. If the third party has a reasonable belief that the agent has the authority to
commit the act, then the principal may be liable for the act. Normally, the difference
between actual and apparent authority only matters to the agent and the principal, as
the distinction only serves to determine whether the principal has a cause of action
against the agent.96 However, the comparison serves to show that scope of
employment in criminal law has greatly exceeded the bounds of authority in the law
of agency.97

90 Jonathan R. Macey, Agency Theory and the Criminal Liability of Organizations, 71 BOS.
U. L. REV. 315, 319 (1991).
91 This could be fleshed out further in a note all its own, but for the purpose of this discussion,
simply sharing a definition of the phrase will suffice here.
92 Automated Med. Lab’ys., 770 F.2d at 406.
93 Hilton Hotels, 467 F.2d at 1007.
94 Agency, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
95 Actual Authority, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
96 Apparent Authority, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
97 Another disconnect between agency theory liability and corporate criminal liability was
raised in United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers. United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 138
F.3d 961, 975–77 (D.C. Cir. 1998), aff’d, 526 U.S. 398 (1999). Corporate criminal liability
matters often place increased culpability on corporations when the employee at issue held a
“high-level decision-making or sensitive position.” See, e.g., U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 2C1.2 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018). Traditional agency law only focuses on the scope of
employment of the employee and does not place an additional degree of importance on the
agent’s role within the corporation. One would expect that the authority of an employee would
be different depending on their rank in the corporation under both sources of law. But a highlevel employee’s conduct does not become somehow more damning against its employer under
agency law. The appellate court in Sun-Diamond Growers (later affirmed by the Supreme
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The expansive definition of “scope of employment” does have public policy
justifications. Primarily, it serves to spur corporations towards comprehensively
monitoring their employees. After all, corporations are in a better position than outside
regulators to prevent, observe, and report misconduct. Additionally, corporations are
often more attractive defendants. There is greater glory to be found in bringing a
corporation to heel. Punitive damages and fines against individuals pale in comparison
to those levied against their corporate employers.98
A.

Impracticable Compliance Expectation

However, this approach creates injustices and impracticalities that outweigh the
perceived benefits. First and foremost, corporations cannot be reasonably expected to
prevent their employees from acting for personal, nonbusiness reasons. Compliance
programs are the bedrock of corporate regulations, seen by Congress, federal agencies,
and the courts as the mechanism by which corporations can limit employee behavior
and accordingly limit their liability as principals. Thus, the fundamental question that
must be asked for any corporate liability matter is whether the conduct could have
been prevented if a reasonable compliance program had been in place.
It is unreasonable to suggest that employers can effectively address employee
activities that are driven by personal, nonbusiness motives. There are numerous
problems in monitoring motivations. Personal desires are very difficult for an observer
to gauge. An employer can only be so intrusive into the minds of its employees before
it faces serious matters of privacy law. Moreover, in today’s competition for human
capital, a company risks losing a recruiting edge when it engages in investigative
practices against its own employees. Even if a corporation came right out and asked
employees to name their “enemies,” how many employees would be honest? Would
the purchasing agent in Hilton Hotels have admitted to his supervisor that he had
developed a contentious relationship with a supplier? Such an admission might very
well have put his job in jeopardy. Asking employees to report themselves is not likely
to accomplish much at all.
Even if a compliance program could be effective, the cost of doing so may lead
companies towards simply accepting the potential for liability. Cost benefit analyses
are common corporate decision-making tools.99 If the perceived liability is lower than

Court) seemed to suggest that position within the company has some further effect on scope of
employment. As noted by Weismann: “The opinion does not elaborate. Presumably, a lower
lower-level employee may be deemed to be a renegade employee as opposed to the case of a
higher-level employee responsible for formulating company policy.” WEISMANN, supra note
81, at 69–70. It seems the opinion may have been hinting at some small portion of the solution
proposed in this Note by aiming at renegade employees.
98 See, e.g., U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, 2019 ANNUAL REPORT AND SOURCEBOOK OF SENTENCING
STATISTICS (2020). While this year serves as a fine example, a comparison of “Table 17” to
“Table O-2” from any given report year shows a stark contrast.
99 Tim Stobierski, How To Do A Cost-Benefit Analysis & Why It’s Important, HARVARD
BUSINESS SCHOOL ONLINE (Sept. 5, 2019), https://online.hbs.edu/blog/post/cost-benefitanalysis.
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the perceived cost of avoiding that liability, the corporation will always choose to take
the risk.100
The effectiveness and costs of a hypothetical compliance initiative are difficult to
measure because courts and regulatory bodies have failed to fully define what an ideal
compliance program looks like. The most likely method of compliance, hinted at by
the court in Hilton Hotels, would involve supervisors following up on their
instructions to employees.101 Using that as a starting point, consider that there is no
defined number of follow ups, nor a defined time at which to follow up. The court in
Hilton Hotels implied that there is some theoretical level at which a corporation will
have relieved itself of liability. However, without a better sense of where that threshold
is, the corporation would be spending money on compliance in shear hope that it hit
the mark. Reasonable persons, let alone reasonable corporations, do not spend so
loosely.
Even if an ideal compliance program was a realistic option, there are still
fundamental tenets of justice that weigh against a finding of corporate liability. The
doctrine of respondeat superior is based in negligence, as opposed to the almost strict
liability regime we see here. Torts of negligence require the existence of a duty. A
corporation can be said to have duties to its customers, its employees, its business
community, and even society in a broad sense. However, to suggest that a corporation
has a special duty to the personal enemies of its employees requires a substantial
logical leap.
B.

Potential for Abuse by Employees

Without a substantial change, employees can wield their corporations as shields
while they do great harm to their foes and bystanders alike. Termination, the main
threat a corporation has over its employee, is simply not a great enough deterrent to
an employee misusing a corporation’s power. If termination alone were a strong
enough deterrent, the government would not need to insist that corporations build
compliance programs that prevent criminal acts.102
Consider a hypothetical situation with a fact pattern similar to that in Hilton Hotels.
Federal prosecutors are highly motivated to convict corporate defendants. In 2019, the
average fine for individual antitrust defendants was under $46,000,103 while
organizational antitrust defendants were fined over $33,000,000 on average. 104 If an
ambitious prosecutor was assigned a case like Hilton, is there not a significant
incentive to offer the individual defendant a deal in exchange for cooperating against
the corporation? In fact, in 2019, twenty percent of eligible defendants cut deals just

100 See generally Stephen G. Gilles, Negligence, Strict Liability, and the Cheapest CostAvoider, 78 VA. L. REV. 1291 (1992).
101 United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1005 (9th Cir. 1972).
102 U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8.
103 U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, 2019 ANNUAL REPORT
STATISTICS 66 (2020).

AND

SOURCEBOOK

OF

SENTENCING

104 Id. at 170.
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like that.105 Even those who did go to jail were only sentenced to an average of six
months.106 If an employee is so determined to harm another that they are willing to
commit a felony, these penalties are arguably not enough to make them think twice.
Moreover, it makes the employer corporation an attractive tool to commit harm on
your enemies. After all, if you used a lock pick to break into your enemy’s business
and cause damage, you would likely receive an extra sentence for using criminal tools.
But, if you simply use your employer to accomplish the same thing, you might get no
jail time at all!
C.

The Supreme Court after Hilton Hotels

While the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Hilton Hotels, it has addressed issues
related to that decision more recently. The Court has reiterated in the years since
Hilton Hotels that any intended benefit to the employer satisfies the second element
of respondeat superior.107 While providing a certain amount of clarity through
redundancy, these reiterations of the law have also raised new issues.
The Supreme Court has also addressed the matter of “personal pique” in Sherman
Act antitrust cases. In Nynex v. Discon, the Court considered another case in which a
per se Sherman Act boycott violation was alleged.108 While Nynex was a civil case109
which the Court connected to Klor’s,110 the Court included a comment on “personal
pique” in a nod to Hilton Hotels.111 The Court declined to impose the per se rule in
Nynex:
To apply the per se rule here — where the buyer's decision, though not made
for competitive reasons, composes part of a regulatory fraud — would
transform cases involving business behavior that is improper for various
reasons, say, cases involving nepotism or personal pique, into trebledamages antitrust cases. And that per se rule would discourage firms from
105 Id. at 68.
106 Id. at 64.
107 See, e.g., United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 526 U.S. 398, 404–10 (1999), aff’g
138 F.3d 961 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Am. Soc'y of Mech. Eng'rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556,
573–74 (1982).
108 Nynex Corp. v. Discon, 525 U.S. 128, 130–33 (1998).
109 Id. Discon, Inc., a telecommunications contractor, sued under the civil recovery
provisions of the Sherman Act. The defendant Nynex Corp. had previously been associated with
a monopoly (AT&T) which had been broken up by the federal government. Discon alleged that
Nynex discriminated against their apparently better offer in favor of a fraudulent offer involving
AT&T subsidiaries.
110 Id. at 135–36.
111 The court never explicitly mentions Hilton Hotels in its Nynex decision, but there are two
pieces of evidence that strongly support the notion that this mention of “personal pique” was
connected to Hilton Hotels. First, this is the only Supreme Court opinion that uses the words
“personal pique”. Second, the issue of Hilton Hotels and Nynex are closely connected. Both
cases involved liability (though of different forms) attaching based on a per se boycott violation
under the Sherman Act.
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changing suppliers — even where the competitive process itself does not
suffer harm.112
This makes it clear that the Supreme Court finds that violations caused by personal
pique are unworthy of treble damages under the Sherman Act. While this is not a
reversal of the Hilton Hotels decision,113 it does bring it into question. The Nynex
decision suggests that the plaintiff in Klor’s would not be entitled to treble damages if
the defendant Broadway-Hale had been able to prove that its boycott was motivated
by a “personal pique” of an employee. The Court applied the holdings of Klor’s in
Nynex, thus reaffirming the holding that the plaintiff is entitled to treble damages if a
boycott was motivated by a business’ grudge with another business. 114 This
difference definitively disproves the equivalency between “personal pique” and
business-to-business “grudges” that the Ninth Circuit pulled out of Klor’s in its Hilton
Hotels decision.
V. PROPOSED SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM CREATED BY HILTON HOTELS
The best solution for the problem created by Hilton Hotels would be an affirmative
“personal, nonbusiness motive” defense to the common law doctrine of respondeat
superior. This would achieve the result of limiting liability to only those who are
responsible for the wrongdoing, while avoiding the downsides that accompany other
potential solutions. Because of the complexities involved with this issue, the defense
should be a bar to prosecution. A judge should rule that, as a matter of law, the
employee acted outside their scope of employment, if the employer can prove, by clear
and convincing evidence, that the employee committed the crime for personal,
nonbusiness reasons.
It may seem as if this defense would be better applied to the second element
(benefit to the principal) of respondeat superior. However, there are three
considerations that make this proposed defense a better fit with “scope of
employment.” First, as mentioned before, there are strong public policy reasons to
maintain the second element as it currently is. Second, this defense lies closest to the
“purpose” subcomponent of “scope of employment.” While the mens rea component
of “intent” is attached to “benefit the principal,” it is not a substitute for the “purpose”
within “scope of employment.” As noted above, this intent component has largely
become an irrelevant portion of the second respondeat superior element anyway.
Finally, attaching this defense to the first element of respondeat superior (scope of
employment) eliminates any confusion regarding ill-gotten gains that might come
from attaching it to the second element, or attaching it to respondeat superior as a
whole. If the defense disproved the second element, it could lead to some unfortunate
holdings which confuse the fact that an employee’s “personal, nonbusiness motives”
can still result in outcomes that improperly benefit an employer.

112 Nynex, 525 U.S. at 136–37 (emphasis added).
113 Given the difference in sources of liability between the two cases (criminal versus civil),
and the lack of an explicit statement, it would be a reach to suggest that the Supreme Court
overruled Hilton Hotels in Nynex.
114 See Nynex, 525 U.S. at 134–35.
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Alternative Solutions and Their Drawbacks

There are other methods that could cure or help to limit the injustice created by
rogue employees that are driven by personal vendettas. All of these must be considered
with the understanding that there are compelling public policy reasons for corporate
criminal liability115 and that any changes should not be disproportional to the existing
harm or create new harms. These principles serve to rule out a number of more
dramatic possibilities. For instance, some scholars promote the view that corporate
civil liability can, if properly structured, serve the same purpose as the current system
of corporate criminal liability.116 Besides the desire for better mutual outcomes, this
view is also driven by concerns over the disparate rights that corporations and
individuals have in criminal prosecutions.117 But doing away with corporate criminal
liability entirely would be a drastic departure from over a hundred years of precedent.
Such a change would not likely come from the courts due to judicial adherence to stare
decisis.118 The change is perhaps even less likely to come from the legislature.
Congress has persistently left corporate criminal liability clauses intact in legislation
like the Sherman Act.119
A more targeted statutory change may be more realistic than the hard reset
proposed by those who favor doing away with corporate criminal liability entirely.
Congress has created an opening which some scholars believe could serve as a defense
to corporate criminal liability in some white collar cases. 120 The “Mail fraud and other
fraud offenses” chapter of the U.S. Code prohibits various forms of fraudulent activity,
including a “scheme or artifice to defraud.”121 Though the chapter itself was formed

115 See public policy discussion supra pp. 6–8, 17.
116 See Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It
Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1532–34 (1996).
117 See Henning, supra note 36, at 795–802, 820–21. Perhaps the biggest point of contention
centers on mens rea elements and a corporation’s ability to form intent. This issue is too broad
to do justice to here, but it does raise some particularly interesting questions within this Note’s
scope. First, what is the unconstitutionally vague method by which a corporation manifests its
intent? Publicly stated corporate policy cannot form intent by itself, lest we have corporations
simply put “do not break the law” in their articles of incorporation and thus escape all liability.
Some additional expression from the agents of the corporation must be included when
evaluating intent. But if a supervisor twice instructing his employee against an illegal action, as
in Hilton, is not enough to consider that the corporation did not intend to commit the crime,
what is? Traditionally the law says that the corporation assumes the intent of the agent if the
corporation breaches its duty to supervise. But as this Note argues, that duty is ill defined.
118 See Kimble v. Marvel Ent., LLC, 576 U.S. 446, 447 (2015). The Supreme Court respects
the doctrine of stare decisis and stated that it “provides that today’s Court should stand by
yesterday’s decisions.” It further held that where “the precedent interprets a statute, stare decisis
carries enhanced force, since critics are free to take their objections to Congress.”
119 See, e.g., the development of the Sherman Act as a result of the Clayton Act and
Robinson-Patman Act of 1936. 15 U.S.C. § 13.
120 WEISMANN, supra note 81, at 32.
121 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341–51.
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in 1948, § 1346 was added in 1988 to shed additional light on what a “scheme or
artifice to defraud” encompasses. For the purposes of the chapter, “the term ‘scheme
or artifice to defraud’ includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible
right of honest services.”122 But the Supreme Court interpreted § 1346 as narrowly as
possible, holding that “§ 1346 covers only bribery and kickback schemes.”123 If
Congress intended § 1346 to apply more broadly as the prosecution in Skilling
suggested, Congress could amend the statute to make that clear. Under that broader
understanding of § 1346, corporations could claim that they were in fact the victim of
the employee’s conduct, shielding the corporation from liability for the employee’s
actions. However, the existence of any employer benefit that satisfies the second
element may still result in a finding of corporate liability.124 Even if Congress
broadened § 1346, it would still only apply to Chapter 63 fraud indictments.125
Congress would have to apply the “dishonest services” protection to the Sherman Act,
or corporate criminal liability in general, to reach cases like Hilton Hotels.
There are general concerns that also make statutory changes a less attractive
solution. Changing statutes is a long and unlikely business. A single statute change
that created an affirmative defense like the proposed solution for all instances of
corporate criminal liability would be frighteningly broad. Changing each statute under
which a corporation can be found criminally liable would be an enormous endeavor.
In addition, lawmakers would be faced with the reality that this subject would not be
particularly appealing to voters. Even pro-business voters may feel that there are better
uses for their legislators’ time.
The problem exhibited in Hilton Hotels could also be addressed by reevaluating
jury instructions involving the duty to supervise. But altering that portion of the law
would have undesirable consequences. Revisiting jury instructions for corporate
criminal trials in general would be a noble pursuit. Jury instructions in corporate cases
are already lengthy and frequently confusing. Ideal jury instructions are “brief,
concise, nonrepetitive, relevant to the case’s details, understandable to the average
juror, and should correctly state the law without misleading the jury or inviting

122 Id. § 1346.
123 Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 368 (2010). Skilling was a longtime executive of
Enron up until the company’s notorious bankruptcy. The Government sought to charge Skilling
under the “honest-services” theory of wire fraud for depriving the Enron shareholders and the
broader public of honest services. The Court unanimously agreed that § 1346 was not properly
applied but had two distinct approaches on resolving the issue. The majority opinion believed
that § 1346 was too broad and required the insertion of the “bribery and kickback schemes”
language would remedy the issue while reflecting congressional intent. Scalia’s concurrence
found that § 1346 was unconstitutionally vague and that the Court was wrongfully inserting
itself into the legislative process by inserting terms which appeared nowhere in the statute.
124 See United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 138 F.3d 961, 970 (D.C. Cir. 1998). The
circuit court found that the bribery and kickback scheme created by the employee was meant to
benefit his employer. Thus, even if § 1346 was expanded to touch all cases of fraud, the
defendant corporation would still have to show that its employee did not act intending to benefit
the employer.
125 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341–51.
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unnecessary speculation.”126 One need look no further than the infamous Arthur
Andersen LLP v. United States to see just how confounding these jury instructions can
be.127 During initial deliberations, only four of the jurors in the trial court for Arthur
Andersen committed to a guilty verdict.128 It was not until the trial judge issued more
instructions that the jury returned a guilty verdict.129Adding additional language about
the duty to supervise in cases like Hilton Hotels could complicate matters in a similar
fashion to Arthur Andersen.130 It is better to leave the matter to the experience of a
judge.131 In spite of the tremendous benefit that jury instruction reform could have on
corporate crime cases as a whole, it would likely leave cases like Hilton Hotels
untouched. The Supreme Court, which would be a necessary participant in such
reform, has shown more interest in evaluating the jury instructions regarding corporate
intent than respondeat superior cases in which the corporation takes on the intent of
its agent.132
Another potential solution could come from an adjustment to the Justice
Department’s guidelines for prosecution. The Department of Justice could include a
“compliance program” or a “nonbusiness reason” bar to prosecution. Similar to the
Federal Sentencing Commission’s guidelines, the Department of Justice does not have
a sufficiently detailed or tiered understanding of corporate compliance programs.133
The “compliance” bar would certainly be more beneficial to the Department of Justice
itself. The definition of the ideal compliance program could be structured in a way that

126 Jury Instructions, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/jury_instructions
(last updated June 2020).
127 Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 708 (2005). The Supreme Court
reversed the conviction of Arthur Andersen based on problematic jury instructions.
128 WEISMANN, supra note 81, at 8.
129 Id.
130 There are movements like The Plain Language Action and Information Network (a group
of federal employees who can be found at www.plainlanguage.gov) who support keeping jury
instructions in concise, plain language. Seeing as I have had to inject phrases like “nonbusiness
reason” into my own proposed solution, it is hard to imagine a jury instruction that could
adequately confer these concepts to a jury in sufficiently clear language.
131 This would also have the additional benefit of avoiding a costly trial.
132 The Enron Scandal, its direct descendants, and spiritual successors, have taken up a great
deal of the focus of regulators, courts, and scholars over the past two decades.
133 Building a more detailed view of corporate compliance programs would likely be closer
to the core competencies of the Justice Department then the Federal Sentencing Commission.
After all, members of the Justice Department must think every day about ways that their
corporate targets could have fulfilled their duty to supervise, as they proceed in building cases
to show how targets breached that duty. The Justice Department also has a significant number
of employees who used to work in the corporate compliance sector.
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quality programs made prosecution more cooperative and generally easier. 134 While
changes to the Department of Justice guidelines could be effective, they could also be
ignored.135 Furthermore, given that the guidelines were not changed in this respect
during the “corporate-friendly” Trump Administration,136 it is hard to believe that
such changes are likely to occur in the foreseeable future.
Finally, the Federal Sentencing Commission could consider making substantive
changes to the definition of compliance programs and their related effect on
sentencing. This is perhaps the “second best” solution to the problem, as it could
provide much needed clarity about what makes a satisfactory compliance program,
while generating outcomes that are more just. To reach the effectiveness of the
proposed common law defense, the Commission would likely need to take a tiered
approach in which degrees of quality in compliance are explicitly defined. In such a
scheme, a superb compliance program would bar, at the very least, all punitive
damages. But make no mistake, this would be a difficult solution to implement. After
acknowledging a change should be made, the Commission would have to almost
completely restructure Chapter 8 of the Guidelines. The Commission would also have
to reach out to compliance experts for help in developing reasonable and effective
definitions and tiers. However, even if the Sentencing Guidelines were improved,
there is no obligation for sentencing courts to follow them.137
VI. CONCLUSION
Either a circuit court or the Supreme Court should revisit the issue of corporate
criminal liability, as the current system does not adequately place liability on those
who are truly at fault. Hilton Hotels stands as an example of the problems imposed
created by the poorly defined “scope of employment” term, as well as an example of
a circuit court misapplying a Supreme Court ruling. The Ninth Circuit’s decision in
that case does not render the intended public policy benefit. Instead, it encourages
employees to use their companies as tools to engage in private spats with their
enemies.
The Supreme Court and appellate courts seem content with quoting the simple
holding of Hilton Hotels138 without fully examining the facts of the case. The details

134 For instance, standardized record keeping of compliance activities could help prosecutors
in a manner similar to that of the standardized reporting of the Securities and Exchange
Commission.
135 Additionally, both of these solutions limit the possibility of this concept spreading to
other parts of the law, such as agency, tort or contract. While this Note does not focus on those
fields, they similarly suffer from the nebulous “scope of employment” element.
136 Drew Desilver, Trump’s Cabinet Will Be One of the Most Business-Heavy in U.S. History,
PEW RSCH. CTR. (Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/01/19/trumpscabinet-will-be-one-of-most-business-heavy-in-u-s-history/.
137 Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007); Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85,
100–01, 111 (2007). In this pair of cases the Supreme Court asserted that the Sentencing
Guidelines were advisory and established that the proper standard of review for sentences is
whether or not the sentencing court abused its discretion.
138 United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1007 (9th Cir. 1972); see also United
States v. Portac, Inc., 869 F.2d 1288, 1293 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Phelps Dodge
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of Hilton Hotels and its faulty reasoning should not be overlooked, even if there is
good law in portions of its opinion. Hilton Hotels was not only unfair to the corporate
defendant, but also shows a disregard for legislative intent that surrounds many
corporate criminal liability offenses. Strict liability should not be applied by the courts
absent clear congressional intent.
A common law defense to the “scope of employment” element of respondeat
superior is the best way to accomplish justice in cases like Hilton Hotels without
dramatically altering the precedent of such an established doctrine. While changes to
statutes, jury instructions, prosecutorial guidelines, and sentencing guidelines could
all serve to reach fairer outcomes, a common law prosecutorial bar based on “scope
of employment” would be the simplest and most effective means of resolving the
issue.

Indus., Inc., 589 F. Supp 1340, 1358 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (“A corporation is liable under the
Sherman Act for the acts of its agents in the scope of their employment, even though contrary
to general corporate policy and express instructions to the agent.”).
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